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We estimate the effect of fertility on female labor force participation in a cross-country panel data
set using abortion legislation as an instrument for fertility. We find a large negative effect of the fertility
rate on female labor force participation. The direct effect is concentrated among those aged 20-39,
but we find that cohort participation is persistent over time giving an effect among older women. We
present a simulation model of the effect of fertility reduction on income per capita, taking into account
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During the demographic transition, sharp declines in fertility lead to large changes 
in a population’s age structure. Smaller birth cohorts decrease youth dependency ratios 
and mechanically increase output per capita if output per worker and the labor force 
participation rate of the working-age population remain unchanged. This generates the 
demographic dividend, which has been shown to be important in explaining cross-
country variation in the growth of per capita income (Bloom and Freeman 1987; Brander 
and Dowrick 1994; Kelley and Schmidt 1995; Bloom and Williamson 1998; Bloom, 
Canning et al. 2003). 
 
In addition to creating these age structure effects, demographic change may also 
incite behavioral changes. Longer life spans may affect retirement and savings decisions 
(Bloom, Canning et al. 2007), while fertility reduction can affect female labor market 
participation. We use a panel of 97 countries over the period 1960 to 2000 to examine the 
effect of fertility on female labor force participation by five-year age groups. 
 
Studies of the impact of fertility are complicated by the endogeneity of fertility 
and the resulting difficulty in identifying the direction of causality (Browning 1992). In 
microeconomic studies it is common to use twins, or the sex composition of previous 
births, as factors that produce exogenous variation in fertility (e.g., Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin 1980; Angrist and Evans 1998). Changes in legislation have also been used as 
instruments for fertility. Levine, Staiger, Kane and Zimmerman (1999) and Klerman 
(1999) find that the legalization of abortion in the United States led to a decrease in 
fertility. Angrist and Evans (1996) find that state-level legalization of abortion reduced 
fertility and increased the labor force participation of black women. Bailey (2006) uses 
state-level variations in contraceptive pill legislation as an instrument for fertility, and 
finds an effect of fertility on labor force participation.  
 
 In our analysis we use country level abortion legislation as an instrument for 
fertility. Henshaw, Singh and Haas (1999) estimate that worldwide around 26 percent of 
pregnancies end in abortion, making it a common method of avoiding childbirth.   2
Although the precise timing of abortion laws may be considered random, this type of 
liberal legislation may reflect broader trends in society that are also correlated with 
female labor market participation. We control for these social factors by including both 
country fixed effects and country-specific time trends in our analysis. 
 
Mammen and Paxson (2000), expanding on work by Goldin (1995), find the 
relationship between female participation rates and per capita income to be U-shaped. In 
poor, agricultural economies, female participation is high as family responsibilities and 
agricultural work can easily be combined. Female participation is lowest in urbanized, 
middle-income countries that are dominated by a manufacturing sector. Low levels of 
female education, the income effect of male earnings, and the separation of home and 
work environments contribute to lower participation rates.  Female participation rates are 
again high in high-income countries with large service sectors and highly educated 
women. This reflects the role of urbanization in female labor force participation, which 
we control for in our analysis. 
  
Our empirical results imply that the effect of fertility on female labor supply is 
strongest during the fertile years (20–39 years of age). We find a high degree of 
persistence in labor market participation, so that higher total fertility is associated with 
lower female labor force participation even at older ages. On average, our results imply 
that with each additional child, female labor force participation decreases by about 10–15 
percentage points in the age group 25–39, and about 5–10 percentage points in the age 
group 40–49. These results imply a reduction of about four years of paid work over a 
woman’s lifetime for each birth. 
 
To illustrate the growth effects of the demographic transition with endogenous 
labor supply, we simulate long-run income dynamics using a simple production function 
model. We calibrate the model using data for South Korea, which saw a reduction in its 
total fertility rate from 5.6 children per woman in 1962 to 1.2 in 2002. The decline in 
fertility has three main effects. First, lower fertility implies lower population growth, and 
thus increases the capital-to-labor ratio in the standard Solow model. In our simulations,   3
this effect leads to an increase in per capita income of about 36 percent over the period. 
Second, the fertility reduction increases the ratio of working-age population to total 
population by lowering the youth dependency ratio. Keeping age- and sex-specific 
participation rates steady at their 1960 levels, this age structure effect raises the relative 
size of the labor force, leading to a 47 percent increase in per capita income. Third, the 
fertility reduction increases female labor force participation. Using our point estimates 
from the empirical section, we find that the increase in female labor force participation 
generates a further gain in income per capita of 21 percent.   
 
The combination of these effects
2 implies an increase in income per capita by a 
factor of around 2.4. Although this is only a portion of the almost eleven-fold rise in 
income per capita that South Korea saw over the period, the reduction in fertility and 
increase in labor supply per capita may help explain this apparent growth “miracle” 
(Bloom, Canning et al. 2000). Although labor supply per capita is bounded above, and so 
cannot affect the rate of economic growth in the very long run, it can give a substantial 
boost to growth over a medium period of fifty years. If the transition from high fertility to 
low fertility is permanent, then there are long-run effects on age structure and persistent 
effects on female labor supply, and the gains in income per capita may be permanent.  
 
A common finding in the empirical growth literature is that there is little 
relationship between the rate of population growth and the rate of growth of income per 
capita  (see, e.g., Simon 1989). Our results do not invalidate this. We argue that a decline 
in population growth associated with a decrease in fertility can produce economic 
growth. However, if slow rates of population growth are due to ill health and high 
mortality, positive growth effects do not yield. Even though population growth has little 
correlation with economic growth, fertility and mortality rates considered separately 
appear to have large effects (Bloom and Freeman 1987; Kelley and Schmidt 1995). 
 
                                                 
2 The effects are roughly multiplicative, even though the labor supply effects tend to reduce the 
capital/labor ratio somewhat.   4
This paper is structured as follows: in section two, we present a model of labor 
supply and fertility. In section three, we present the data, and in section four, we discuss 
abortion legislation as an instrument for fertility. In section five we present the empirical 
results, and in section six, we discuss our simulation framework and show the simulation 
results of the medium-run effects of fertility decline on per capita income. We conclude 





We propose a simple model of female fertility and labor supply choices. The 
utility function U for a representative woman is defined over consumption c, leisure d, 
and fertility n. It is assumed to be given by:   
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For simplicity we assume a logarithmic functional form. The weight on consumption is 
normalized to 1. The relative weight of leisure in utility is  0 α > , while the relative 
weight given to children is  0. β >  We might think of  0 c  as being negative and 
representing subsistence consumption. Alternatively,  0 c  might be taken to be positive and 
reflect transfers from a working husband to the woman. In addition to the utility of 
children, we assume there is a psychological cost k of avoiding childbirth and achieving 
fertility lower than N, the potential reproductive capacity (or fecundity rate), usually 
taken to be around 15 on average. Obviously, actual fertility is usually regulated to be 
lower than this maximum. This regulation usually takes the form of delayed marriage, 
contraceptive use, abortion, or postpartum insusceptibility due to abstinence and 
breastfeeding after birth (Bongaarts 1984).  
 
Total time available is normalized to one. This is divided between working time l, 
leisure time d, child care bn and other non-market household work ε . That is,    
  1 ldb nε = ++ + (1.2) 
The time allocated to child care is assumed to be linear in the number of children, 
with a time cost per child b. We assume  0 b >  and 01 ε ≤ < . A woman's consumption   5
possibilities are limited by the amount of income she earns: the prevailing wage w times 
the amount of time she spends working l. All income earned is consumed, and the 
consumption constraint is defined as  
  cw l =  (1.3) 
 
We assume  0 (1 ) 0 wc ε −+> , so that consumption above the subsistence level is 
feasible. We treat constraints (1.2) and (1.3) as binding; if they are regarded as inequality 
constraints the fact that consumption and leisure time are always desirable will make 
them binding under maximization. Given these time allocation and consumption 
constraints we can write utility as a function of labor supply and the number of children:     
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where 0 nN ≤≤ and 01 l ≤≤. 
 























In Appendix A we show that the Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite, which implies 
that the first-order conditions above generate a local maximum. Given a fixed number of 
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We wish to estimate the structural equation (1.7) to find the effect of variations in 
fertility on female labor supply. The optimal labor supply is decreasing in fertility and the   6
slope of the relationship depends on the time cost of children and the relative weights of 
consumption and leisure in utility. There is a possibility that the time required by other 
non-market household work ε  is random and not observed, which will create an error 
term in the estimation of equation (1.7). However, the non-market work time required 
also affects fertility in equation (1.8). Both fertility and labor supply are thus jointly 
determined and the parameters of equation (1.7) will not be identified in a simple 
regression.  However, solving equations (1.7) and (1.8) for fertility we have 






























This implies that optimal fertility is high when the cost of fertility control is high. The 
cost of fertility control is correlated with the fertility decision, but is not correlated with 
the error term in labor supply given by equation (1.7). The cost of fertility control affects 
labor supply only through its effect on the level of fertility. It follows that the cost of 
fertility control can be used as an instrument for fertility in estimating equation (1.7). 
 
   The wage rate affects both fertility and labor supply. The effect depends on the 
balance of income and substitution effects. If  0 0 c > , the substitution effect dominates, 
and, conditional on fertility, labor supply is rising with female wages. On the other hand, 
if  0 0 c < , the income effect dominates, and for a given fertility female labor supply is 
declining in the wage rate.  
 
  We estimate the causal negative effect of fertility on labor supply, holding 
everything else constant, as given by equation (1.7). Note, however, that fertility and 
labor supply can rise together if some of the parameters in our model change. For 
example, a decrease in ε , the time required for non-child related work in the home, can 
increase both fertility and female labor supply, which is consistent with the positive   7
correlation between female labor supply and fertility in OECD countries found by 
Engelhardt and Prskawetz (2004).  
 
 
3. Data  
 
The data set we use in our empirical work is an unbalanced five-year panel 
covering the period from 1960 to 2000 for 97 countries.
3 The dependent variable in our 
empirical analysis is female labor force participation. Labor market participation data are 
taken from the International Labor Organization (2007) and cover all age groups between 
15–19 years old and 60–64 years old in five-year age increments. The International Labor 
Organization (ILO) data are based on national labor market surveys and censuses. The 
female participation rate is the number of economically active women divided by the 
total female population in the same age group. Although definitions vary slightly across 
countries, a woman is classified as “economically active” if she is either employed or 
actively looking for work (ILO Bureau of Statistics 2007).  
 
Our explanatory variables are the fertility rate, the percentage of the population 
living in urban areas, physical capital per working-age person, female life expectancy and 
the average years of schooling of men and women. We use the stock of physical capital 
per working-age person, female life expectancy and the education level of women as a 
proxy for the wage rate. The education level of men serves as a proxy for male income 
and intra-family transfers, even though male education may also directly affect female 
wages if male and female human capital are substitutes.    
 
Total fertility rates, female life expectancy and urbanization rates are from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006). The physical capital stock is from 
the Penn World Tables 6.2  (Heston, Summers et al. 2006), deflated by the working-age 
population rather than the number of workers as would be more usual, to avoid potential 
simultaneity biases in our estimation. Our human capital measures are the average years 
                                                 
3 For a full list of countries, please see Appendix Table A2.   8
of schooling in the female and male population aged 15 and older, respectively, as 
measured by Barro and Lee (2000).   
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our main variables; a more detailed 
description of the data and data sources is provided in Appendix Table A1. The total 
fertility rate ranges from 1.18 (Spain and Italy in 1995) to 8.5 (Rwanda in 1980), with an 
average in the panel of 4.35. The average female labor force participation shows little 
variation across age groups, but great variation across countries for each age group. 
Figure 1 shows average female participation rates for women aged 15–64 in 2000. These 
range from values close to 90 percent in Tanzania and Mozambique to only 20 percent in 
Egypt, and show a pronounced U-shape. Figure 2 shows the change in participation over 
the period 1980 to 2000. Although a general increase in female labor force participation 
is visible in the data, and particularly pronounced in high-income countries, there is 
sizable variation in participation rates, ranging from an increase of more than 25 percent 
in Ecuador, Peru and Kuwait to a decrease of nearly 20 percent in Turkey.  
 [Table 1] 
4. Abortion Legislation as an Instrument for Fertility 
 
To construct an instrument for fertility we use data on national abortion 
legislation compiled by the United Nations Population Division (United Nations 
Population Division 2002). The data contain detailed information on the availability of 
abortion over time.
4 We use the United Nations system to classify the laws in place. The 
United Nations system classifies seven legal reasons for an abortion: to save the life of 
the woman; to preserve her physical health; to preserve her mental health; consequent on 
rape or incest; fetal impairment; economic or social reasons; and available on request. 
Our data contain indicator variables for each of these seven categories. A “1” indicates 
that abortion is available for the given reason, and “0” means that it is not. When an 
abortion is available on request, we assume availability for any of the other reasons if this 
is not explicitly stated.   
                                                 
4 We are grateful to Mansour Farahani for compiling the data.   9
 
  Although these categories are broad, they are not comprehensive descriptions of 
abortion law. There are frequently cutoffs for lawful abortions depending on the length of 
the pregnancy. The mechanisms for adjudicating if a pregnancy meets a particular 
criterion differs across countries, relying in some cases on a single doctor, while in others 
two are more doctors are required to agree. In some countries a husband's consent is 
required. The United Nation coding scheme ignores these additional factors and declares 
an abortion for a particular reason lawful if it is allowed at any time during the 
pregnancy. In federal systems, abortion laws sometimes differ across regions. In this case 
the law that covers the majority of the population, if one exists, is used to classify at the 
national level.  
 
  We use the values of these variables as coded by the United Nations to provide a 
value for the most recent year at which data are available. For earlier years we recode the 
variable to reflect a country's legal situation at a given time as set out in the United 
Nations documentation of abortion legislation history. This recoding is complicated by 
the need to consider not only statutes that relate to abortion, but also the evolution of case 
law in the interpretation of those statutes.  
  
In many countries there is a divergence between law and practice, with abortions 
being widely available despite being technically illegal, or vice versa. We take the 
objective stance and code according to the law. For example, in the United Kingdom 
(excluding Northern Ireland) the Abortion Act of 1967 allows abortion to protect the life, 
physical and mental health of the mother, and in cases where there is a risk the child will 
be handicapped. The law also covers cases where a birth might affect the health of 
existing children and allows the woman's actual and potential environment to be taken 
into account. Legally, abortion is not explicitly available in the case of rape or simply on 
request. Although this is the legally restricted set of criteria, in practice the physical and 
mental health criteria appear to be interpreted liberally. They include the effects of 
childbirth on socio-economic circumstances and hence health outcomes so that de facto 
an abortion is available if a woman requests one. In the case of rape a claim that abortion  10
was needed to preserve the mental and physical health of the mother would be very likely 
to succeed (as in the case of Rex v. Bourne, 1938). A second example is Chile. The law 
of 1874 prohibited abortions carried out with malice; it was understood that abortions to 
save the life of the mother were permitted. This was explicitly recognized in the law of 
1967. The law was changed in 1989 to outlaw abortions in all circumstances (though 
some commentators suggest that a defense of necessity to save the life of the mother 
would succeed). Despite these strict laws, abortion has been relatively common in Chile 
throughout the period. We code Chile as allowing abortion to save the life of the mother 
from 1960 to 1988 and as not allowing abortion under any circumstances thereafter.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the abortion data. The “life threatening” indicator has an 
average of 0.95, which implies that almost all countries across the sample period allow 
abortion under this circumstance. There is more variation across countries and time for 
the availability of abortion on the remaining categories. We construct an index 
summarizing the availability of abortion. A country gets a score of zero if abortion is not 
legal for any reason. One is added to the score for each circumstance in which abortion is 
available, with a maximum score of 7.  
 
Although we found these abortion indicators to have significant explanatory 
power as a group, it is difficult to find independent effects for the different indicators. 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for the abortion variables. Apart from abortion when 
the pregnancy threatens the life of the mother, which is almost universally allowed, the 
other indicators are highly collinear. We find that each abortion variable has significant 
explanatory power for fertility when used singularly, but additional abortion variables 
add little to the fit of the first-stage regression. Accordingly, using more than one variable 
may lead to a weak instrument problem, increasing the finite sample estimation bias. 
Using multiple instruments would have the potential advantage of allowing an over-
identifying restrictions test of instrument validity; when we use multiple instruments we 
indeed pass this test. However, this test relies on at least one instrument being valid and 
lacks appeal in our context when the intuitive justification for each instrument is the 
same, and it is likely that either all, or none, of our instruments are valid. These issues are  11
discussed in more detail in Murray (2006), and lead us to use only one instrument in our 
analysis. Rather than using one of the raw abortion measures we use an abortion index 
giving equal weight to each measure in an aggregate; this index has a slightly higher 
predictive power for fertility than any single abortion measure.   
 
As an alternative to using a simple additive index, one might consider using the 
principal component of the seven abortion variables in the empirical analysis. As can be 
seen in Table 2, the first principal component is virtually identical to the index we use in 
our empirical specification. The correlation between the abortion index and the first 
principal component is 0.997. The weight assigned to each of the abortion indicators in 
the construction of the first principal component, shown on the final row of Table 2, is 
almost identical for each measure (except for the “life threatening” category) making it 
very similar to an additive index. For ease of interpretation, we use the abortion index 
rather than the first principal component.  
Our abortion index is correlated with fertility, but a key issue is that for abortion 
legislation to be a valid instrument it must be uncorrelated with the error term in the 
female labor market participation regression. It seems likely that the only way that 
abortion laws affect labor market participation is through their effect on fertility. We 
measure the effect through the total fertility rate. The total fertility rate is the number of 
births a woman would have if she experienced the current age-specific fertility in the 
population; this is a period rather than cohort measure. Thus it captures permanent shifts 
in fertility as well as temporary shifts due to changes in the timing of births. 
The instrument validity condition will hold if abortion legislation occurs 
randomly, but this is highly unlikely. There are two ways instrument validity may break 
down if abortion legislation is not random. The first is that abortion legislation is 
endogenously responding to fertility desires, or to female labor force participation, so that 
the direction of causality is the opposite to what we require of an instrument. The second 
is that there are some unobserved variables, perhaps social or cultural norms, which 
influence both abortion legislation and female labor force participation. We control for 
the unobserved national social and cultural norms in our analysis using country fixed  12
effects, and country-specific time trends. This allows the average level and time trend of 
the abortion index in a country to be endogenous. We identify the effect from abortion 
legislation that deviates from the average level and time trend of the abortion legislation 
index in that country. Although the level and time trend in abortion legislation may be 
endogenous, we take the exact timing of abortion legislation, which generates deviations 
from these long-term trends, to be random.  
To examine the issue of reverse causality from fertility or female labor market 
participation to abortion legislation we carry out Granger causality tests. The tests seek to 
determine if lagged female labor force participation of a specific cohort and fertility are 
predictive of abortion legislation. Table 3 reports the results of a regression of our 
abortion legislation index on two lags of its own value, the female participation rate of 
25–29 year olds (the age group whose participation we find is most sensitive to fertility) 
and the total fertility rate. The first column includes worldwide time dummies, the second 
column adds country fixed effects, while the third adds country-specific linear time 
trends. The results in the first column suggest that a low fertility rate and high female 
labor force participation rate are predictive of a higher value of the abortion legislation 
index. However, this predictive power disappears in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 when we 
add country fixed effects (column 2) and country-specific time trends (column 3). These 
results are consistent with the view that there are country-specific cultural factors that 
drive fertility, female labor force participation, and abortion legislation. However, once 
we control for these generic differences in levels and trends using country fixed effects 
and time dummies, movements in the abortion law appear random.    
[Table 3] 
An alternative potential instrument in this context could be the measure of family 
planning program effort compiled by Ross and Stover (2001). The family planning effort 
score provides an aggregate of 30 scores on a range of variables that measure a 
government’s commitment to family planning. We find that there is a positive correlation 
between these effort scores and our abortion law index. We do not use the effort scores as  13
an instrument because of evidence that some of the scores measured may be highly 
responsive to the demand for family planning (Kelly and Cutright 1983).  
A final point about our instrument is that we treat the estimates as identifying a 
single effect of fertility on female labor market participation. If there is heterogeneity in 
the response across women, and abortion legislation only affects the fertility of a 
subgroup of the population, it is the average labor market response to fertility within this 
subgroup (the local average treatment effect) that we measure, not the population average 
response.      
 
 
5. Empirical Specification and Results 
 
Equation 1.7 suggests that female labor force participation depends on the fertility 
rate, the wage rate, and intra-family transfers. We include the fertility rate in our 
empirical specification and proxy the wage rate of women by the ratio of capital per 
working-age person, female life expectancy, and the female education level. The level of 
intra-family transfers is captured using the male education level. In addition to these 
variables, we add the percentage of the population living in urban areas. In agricultural 
societies, the workplace is located around the family home, making it easier to 
simultaneously care for children and work. In urban areas, by contrast, the workplace is 
usually distinct from the home, making it more difficult to do both concurrently. 
Moreover, urbanization can also have a negative effect on female labor supply during the 
transition from agriculture to manufacturing. If working outside the home in manual 
labor carries a social stigma for women, this may reduce their labor market opportunities 
(Goldin 1995).  
 
In our empirical work we estimate the following equation, 
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where Pijt is the participation rate of females of age group i in country j at period t. Fert 
is the total fertility rate, Cap  is the capital stock per working-age person, Life is female 
life expectancy, Urban is the percentage of the population living in urban areas, Edum is 
the average years of schooling of men while Eduf is the average years of schooling of 
women, δij and δit are country and year fixed effects, respectively, while  ij τ  denotes 
country-specific time trends. Note that each of these fixed effects, time dummies, and 
time trends can vary by age group, i. The country fixed effects, time dummies and 
country-specific time trends allow for different labor market institutions and cultural 
norms across countries and over time. 
 
The inclusion of fixed effects and country-specific time trends makes the model 
robust to unobserved heterogeneity, but comes at the cost of reducing the signal-to-noise 
ratio. We therefore start our empirical analysis by estimating the model with fixed effect 
but without country-specific time trends. The regression for the participation of each age 
group is run separately. The results are reported for ten groups aged 15–64, although the 
results for the first group, the age group 15–19, should be treated with caution because 
labor market participation in this group is reduced by school attendance. The results for 
this specification, without instrumentation, are summarized in Table 4 below. 
  
Table 4 shows that the marginal effect of fertility on female labor force 
participation is negative and statistically significant for all age groups between 20 and 44. 
Capital per working-age person, female life expectancy, and female education all appear 
to have positive and relatively large effects on female labor participation (at least for ages 
above 20). Male education reduces female labor market participation, which is consistent 
with male earnings producing an income effect that lowers female work incentives. The 
estimated coefficient on urbanization is negative; a 10 percentage point increase in 
urbanization leads to a decrease in female labor force participation of between 2 and 5 
percentage points. This effect implies high participation in rural economies, even when 
female wages may be low.   
 
[Table 4]  15
 
In Table 5, we use the abortion index as an instrument in a two-stage least squares 
estimation as an alternative specification. The estimated fertility effects are very large: 
according to the instrumental variable (IV) estimates, a unit decrease in the total fertility 
rate leads to an increase of 5 to 17 percentage points in female labor force participation.  
 
The point estimates from the IV estimation appear large in absolute magnitude 
relative to the OLS estimates presented in Table 4. If higher female labor supply 
depresses fertility, the OLS estimate should be larger, and not smaller than the IV 
estimate. One possible explanation for this finding is that measurement error may 
attenuate the OLS estimates but not the instrumental variable estimate. Another possible 
explanation is that fertility and female labor supply are positively correlated due to some 
unobserved variables (for example, the non-child-care time required for household tasks), 
so that instrumentation reduces this omitted variable bias.  
 
The bottom half of Table 5 reports the first-stage estimation of fertility. The 
estimated effect of abortion laws on fertility is relatively small. The maximum increase in 
the abortion index (from 0 to 7) leads to a predicted reduction in fertility of about 0.5 
children. This effect appears reasonable, but is relatively small compared to the average 
change in fertility rates observed in the sample period. The first stage F-statistic larger 




In the OLS estimates in Table 4, female education is associated with higher 
female labor market participation, while male education is associated with lower female 
participation. In Table 5, when fertility is instrumented, these education effects on female 
participation are not statistically significant. Note, however, that education has strong 
effects on fertility in the first-stage regression reported in Table 5. Fertility falls as female 
education levels rise, but rises with male education levels. Because the effect of female 
education is larger, an equal rise in education for both sexes implies lower fertility. It  16
follows that, conditional on fertility, education may not be very significant in the 
participation equation, but it still has a large impact on female labor market participation 
through its effect on fertility. This is similar to the argument by Smith and Ward (1985) 
that the effect of higher female wages on female labor supply works partly through 
fertility reductions. 
 
Although we control for country fixed effects and time dummies in the empirical 
specifications presented in the previous section, one may still worry about country-
specific trends that are not picked up by time fixed effects. As individual societies 
become westernized, more or less religious, or more open to trade, attitudes towards the 
female role in society may change, affecting abortion legislation, fertility, and female 
labor force participation. To control for such trends, we repeat the previous analysis 
allowing for a country-specific time trend. The results, which are summarized in Table 6, 
confirm our previous findings. The inclusion of a country-specific time trend slightly 
lowers the point estimates on capital, urbanization and fertility, but does not change our 
basic result: the average fertility response across the main age groups ranges from 6 to 12 




The effects of fertility on the labor participation of women appear to peak among 
35–39 year olds, and are significant even for 50 year olds. We would expect fertility to 
affect mainly younger women. However, exit from the labor market due to fertility may 
have long-run effects if participation behavior is persistent.  One reason for such 
persistence might be returns to experience, which lower the wages of women who 
temporarily exit the labor market relative to women who stay employed. To investigate 
this, we include lagged cohort participation in the specifications shown in Table 7. 
Because our lagged variable is the participation of a different age group – the age group 
five years younger in the previous time period – rather than lagged participation of the 
same age group, the problem of bias in a dynamic panel with short time dimension 
(Nickell 1981) does not apply.   17
 
The results for the model with lagged participation included as an explanatory 
variable are reported in Table 7. First-stage results for this specification are displayed in 
Table 8. Note that the first stage for the 15–19 year olds (which does not include a lagged 
participation term) is the same as the first stage for fertility when we do not include a lag 
in the specification. This corresponds to the first stage of the static model reported in 
Table 6. Female education is again highly significant in the first-stage regressions, and 
education works indirectly through fertility rather than directly on labor market 
participation. The abortion index is also highly significant in the first-stage regression.  
 
Even when controlling for country fixed effects, time dummies, a country-specific 
time trend, and a lagged cohort participation rate (Table 7), the highly significant 
negative effect of fertility on female labor force participation persists. The marginal 
effect of fertility is statistically significant for the age groups 20–24, 30–34 and 35–39, 
but highly relevant for all age groups given the persistence of female labor force 
participation. The significant coefficient on the lagged participation implies that the 
fertility effect on participation at young ages may impact female labor force participation 
throughout working life.  
 
Although the dynamic framework reported in Tables 7 and 8 seems plausible, we 
regard the results from the static model reported in Table 6 as our preferred estimates. In 
the dynamic estimates, we need to assume the lagged cohort female labor force 
participation to be exogenous. If the disturbances in the model are auto-correlated, this 
assumption will not be valid. In principle, we can overcome this by instrumenting the 
lagged participation rate. However, lagged abortion has little predictive power for lagged 
participation, giving rise to the weak instrument problem. In a dynamic model with fixed 
effects, country-specific time trends, and lagged participation, proper identification of a 
2SLS model becomes difficult. 
 
Overall, our static and dynamic models give very similar estimates of the long-run 
effect of fertility on female labor market participation. Our estimates imply a reduction in  18
paid work of 8 percent of a woman’s potential working life, or 4 years of paid 




To illustrate the magnitude of the growth effects associated with the demographic 
transition, we provide simulation results. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) poses a 
prime example for a developing country moving through the demographic transition, and 
we calibrate our model to this economy. Total fertility rates in South Korea dropped from 
5.6 children per woman in the early 1960s to 1.2 children in the period 2000–2005. 
According to the United Nations, fertility rates in the South Korea are expected to reach 
their low at 0.85 children in 2015 before gradually recovering to levels around 1.35 in the 
long run
5 (World Population Prospects, 2004). As shown in Figure 4, the drop in fertility 
over the last 40 years has been accompanied by a rapid increase in female labor force 
participation rates: average participation in the age group 25–39 has risen from 26.6 




The representative economy we simulate is based on a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function with constant returns to scale. Total output Y in each period t is given 
by 
1
tt t YA K L
α α − =  
where  A is a productivity measure, K is the stock of physical capital, and L denotes the 
labor force. Technological progress and education are assumed to be constant and are 
included in the parameter A. We are interested in how changes in the fertility rate affect 
the labor force, the physical capital stock, and income per capita. The physical capital 
stock Kt in each period t is determined by 
                                                 
5 The numbers cited reflect the United Nations' most conservative projections (low-fertility scenario). We 
use the low fertility scenario as it assumes a continuous decline in fertility for the next 15 years which is 
consistent with the trends in fertility observed over the past 20 years. Results using the other scenarios are 
very similar.   19
11 (1 ) tt t K sY K δ − − = +− , 
where s is the aggregate savings rate and δ is the depreciation rate.  
 
  We initialize our simulations with the age structure in South Korea in 1960. The 
evolution of population numbers and age structure after 1960 in the simulation differ 
from the actual figures recorded in South Korea because we keep age-specific mortality 
rates fixed at their 1960 levels.
6 Our simulation therefore only captures the effect of 
fertility decline on population, and not the impact of improved longevity. Modeling each 
male and female birth cohort separately, the population 
s
it P of sex s, age i, and time t is 
given by  
()
45
1, 1 1 0
16
11 ,
s ss s f
it i t i t s it it
i
PP f o r i P f P σλ −− −
=
=− ≥ = ∑  
where  t f  is the age-specific fertility rate
7 at time t, and  s λ  is the fraction of sex s in 
births. To determine the size of the population we take the age- and sex-specific mortality 
rates 
s
i σ  to be fixed at the 1960 levels.
8 The sex ratio at birth is set at 51 percent male 
and 49 percent female, which corresponds to the makeup of the current adult population 
in South Korea.
9    
 












it ρ  captures the age- and gender-specific labor participation rates at time t.  
 
  We assume capital and labor shares in income to be one third and two thirds 
respectively (so that  1/3 α = ). Our other baseline assumptions are a savings rate s of 24 
                                                 
6 We also perform alternative specifications with actual and predicted survival tables for the period 1960 to 
2050. The results look very similar to the ones presented in this section. 
7 We assume that fertility is distributed uniformly over the fertile years as the exact age of birth is unknown 
in the aggregate data. 
8 Note that (1-σi) is the survival probability between age i and age i+1. 
9 In recent years, the percentage of female newborns has fallen to 47%; we take the average of the last 30 
years as our baseline assumption.  20
percent and an annual capital stock depreciation rate of 8 percent. This gives a steady-
state capital output ratio of three. Rather than estimating the capital stock for South Korea 
in 1960, we assume that the economy starts in steady state with a steady level of GDP per 
capita. This is the steady state that would have emerged if fertility rates, participation 
rates, and mortality schedules had remained at the 1960 levels. Because we consider only 
relative output levels, we set the level of total factor productivity  A to one without loss 
of generality. 
   
The only exogenous variable that we change during the simulation is the fertility 
rate, for which we use the actual and forecast rates as published by the United Nations 
(2004).  Although we assume that male participation rates remain constant at 1960 levels, 
we allow for female labor force participation to respond to the lower fertility in line with 
the estimates reported in Table 6. 
 
We report our simulation results in Figure 5. The baseline is the steady-state 
income per capita level at constant 1960 fertility rates. We then consider the effect of the 
actual and predicted future decline in fertility rates relative to this baseline. We first 
estimate the Solow effect of lower population growth on the capital-labor ratio.  
Assuming that the ratio of workers to population is constant as in the standard Solow 
model, lower fertility rates imply lower population growth, a higher capital-labor ratio 
and higher output per capita. According to our model, income per capita rises by 36 




However, falling fertility also translates to changes in the population age 
structure. Keeping age- and sex-specific participation rates constant at the 1960 levels, 
the “Solow plus age structure” effect in Figure 5 combines the Solow capital-labor effect 
with the high labor supply per capita due to a falling youth dependency ratio. Assuming 
that male and female (age-specific) participation rates do not change, the shift in age 
structure implies that the percentage of population working increases from 31 to 46  21
percent in the long run. This leads to an additional 47 percent in steady-state output per 
capita over and above the Solow effect.
10 It should be noted that the transition is not 
monotonic. The rapid decline in fertility generates a “baby boom cohort,” whose 
members produce high output during their working age, but also a high old-age 
dependency rate once they retire. This cohort effect is very mild in our simulation. Even 
when we include the effect of longer life spans on age structure, the decrease in the youth 
dependency generated by the fertility decline dominates the increase in old-age 
dependency, such that the overall dependency rate declines. This effect is even stronger 
when old-age participation rates are high as is the case in South Korea. 
  
The effects on income per capita are even bigger once we allow for female labor 
market participation to adjust to lower fertility. Using our point estimates from Table 6 to 
simulate the female labor supply responses, we find that the female labor supply response 
leads to an additional increase of steady-state income per capita of 21 percent relative to 
the scenario with the Solow and age structure effect. Combining all effects implies an 
increase in steady-state per capita income of 141 percent relative to the base line.
11 The 
results suggest that reductions in fertility increased the growth rate of per capita income 
in South Korea by 1.9 percent per year between 1960 and 1990. Between 1990 and 2020 
the effect is smaller, increasing the growth rate by 1.2 percent per year. Our simulation 
suggests that economic growth from this source will end around 2020, but that the high 
level of income attained due to low fertility will persist.     
 
Our simulation examines only the effects of fertility decline. In fact, since 1960 
there have been large reductions in mortality rates in South Korea, particularly at older 
ages, while old-age labor market participation rates have declined. Including these effects 
in the simulation reduces the gain in income per capita somewhat and produces a more 
pronounced downturn in income per capita after 2020 due to population aging and earlier 
retirement, though the long run steady-state income level stays well above its 1960 level.  
                                                 
10 The effects do not add up linearly because the capital-labor ratio “Solow” effect is somewhat reduced by 
higher labor force participation. 
11 The individual effects multiply each other; 36 percent Solow effect is multiplied by 47 percent from age 
structure and 21 percent from the female labor supply response: (1.36 1.47 1.21 2.41) × ×= .   22
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
The concept  of the "demographic dividend" (Bloom, Canning et al. 2001; Bloom, 
Canning et al. 2003) elucidates the economic benefits that a country can gain if it 
experiences a decline in fertility. The decline in fertility reduces population growth, and 
increases the capital-labor ratio. At the same time, the shift in fertility increases the ratio 
of working-age to total population; compounding this is the positive behavioral response 
of female labor force participation, which further increases labor supply per capita. Using 
a simulation model, our parameter estimates suggest that the effects of fertility reduction 
on income levels can be large – more than doubling the steady-state level of output per 
capita.   
 
  In this paper, we have only considered the effect of fertility on female labor 
supply. The model presented here does not account for the possible effect on education of 
a decline in fertility. Increased female labor supply may raise the economic returns to 
women’s schooling, providing positive incentives for women to invest in education. The 
effect of fertility on saving is another important aspect not taken into account. To the 
extent that children provide old-age support to their parents, a decline in fertility may 
increase financial savings for old age and retirement. The decline in fertility may also 
have beneficial effects on long-run economic growth by allowing greater investment in 
children’s health and education. These mechanisms suggest that the overall effect of a 
fertility decline on economic growth may be even larger than we report.  23
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Abortion: Pregnancy Life Threatening 0.95 0.21 0 1
Abortion: Pregnancy Threatening Physical Health 0.56 0.50 0 1
Abortion: Pregnancy Treatening Mental Health 0.52 0.50 0 1
Abortion: Rape 0.37 0.48 0 1
Abortion: Fetal Impairment 0.32 0.47 0 1
Abortion: Economic Reasons 0.22 0.42 0 1
Abortion: Request 0.17 0.37 0 1
Abortion Index 3.11 2.29 0 7
Total Fertility Rate 4.35 2.04 1.18 8.50
Average years of schooling, male, age >15 5.4 2.8 0.3 12.2
Average years of schooling, female, age >15 4.5 3.0 0.0 12.0
Capital per Working Age Person 23.2 27.4 0.3 138.2
Female Life Expectancy at birth 64.1 12.6 33.4 84.6
Urban population (% of total) 48.1 24.7 3.2 100
Real GDP per capita (Real 2004 $, PPP) 7,340 7,531 171 64,640
Female Participation Age 15-19 39.0 19.0 3.6 89.0
Female Participation Age 20-24 55.8 18.4 12.2 100.0
Female Participation Age 24-29 55.7 19.8 10.9 100.0
Female Participation Age 30-34 55.7 21.4 12.5 100.0
Female Participation Age 35-39 56.5 22.4 11.9 100.0
Female Participation Age 40-44 56.5 22.7 11.7 100.0
Female Participation Age 45-49 54.7 23.0 8.7 100.0
Female Participation Age 50-54 50.2 22.8 5.4 98.0
Female Participation Age 55-59 43.3 22.7 3.1 94.2
Female Participation Age 60-64 33.1 21.8 1.2 88.9
Notes: Based on the sample of 770 observations
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Table 2: Correlation between Abortion Laws 























Reasons Request Abortion 
Index
Life Threatening  1.000
Physical Health 0.238 1.000
Mental Health  0.221 0.932 1.000
Rape  0.165 0.616 0.587 1.000
Fetal Impairment  0.157 0.633 0.629 0.836 1.000
Economic Reasons  0.135 0.542 0.578 0.745 0.813 1.000
Request  0.120 0.505 0.542 0.715 0.754 0.875 1.000
Abortion Index  0.273 0.828 0.834 0.870 0.900 0.873 0.839 1.000
First Principal Component  0.253 0.815 0.822 0.874 0.906 0.883 0.850 1.000
First Princ. Comp. Weight  0.136 0.399 0.395 0.402 0.430 0.410 0.389 28
Table 3: Granger Causality Tests on the Abortion Index 
Abortion Index (t - 5) 0.856*** 0.483*** 0.132***
(0.032) (0.080) (0.042)
Abortion Index (t - 10) 0.035* -0.069** -0.231***
(0.019) (0.032) (0.043)
Fertility (t - 5) -0.274** -0.162 -0.254
(0.132) (0.149) (0.181)
Fertility (t - 10) 0.172 0.237 0.151
(0.124) (0.158) (0.189)
Participation Rate 25-29 (t - 5) 0.019* 0.010 0.020
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
Participation Rate 25-29 (t - 10) -0.016* 0.002 -0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.017)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Country Time Trends No No Yes
Observations 576 576 576
R-squared 0.84 0.90 0.95
F-stat p-value (Fertility) 0.00*** 0.31 0.37
F-test p-value (Participation Rate) 0.18 0.22 0.28
F-test p-value (Fertility and Participation Rate) 0.01*** 0.41 0.19
Notes:
Dependent Variable: Abortion Index
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 29
Table 4: Female Labor Force Participation, Fixed Effects Estimation  
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Total Fertility Rate 0.703 -2.359*** -3.094*** -2.386*** -1.570** -1.291* -0.203 0.202 0.859 -0.110
(0.554) (0.613) (0.643) (0.684) (0.707) (0.682) (0.642) (0.584) (0.529) (0.377)
Female life expectancy 0.344*** 0.312*** 0.117 0.136 0.275** 0.169* 0.214** 0.100 0.253*** 0.175***
(0.075) (0.089) (0.084) (0.091) (0.113) (0.098) (0.096) (0.076) (0.075) (0.052)
Capital to Working age population -0.198*** 0.144*** 0.453*** 0.413*** 0.385*** 0.379*** 0.377*** 0.318*** 0.214*** 0.027
(0.031) (0.033) (0.041) (0.055) (0.057) (0.053) (0.050) (0.043) (0.032) (0.020)
Urban population (% of total)  -0.158** -0.064 -0.353*** -0.386*** -0.380*** -0.302*** -0.255*** -0.120 -0.023 0.068
(0.075) (0.088) (0.085) (0.095) (0.098) (0.093) (0.092) (0.084) (0.074) (0.069)
Average schooling years, male >15yrs 0.175 -1.612** -1.772** -2.052*** -1.901** -2.079*** -1.563** -1.127 -1.001 -0.917*
(0.592) (0.665) (0.703) (0.763) (0.816) (0.795) (0.761) (0.701) (0.631) (0.486)
Average schooling years, female >15yrs 0.360 2.942*** 3.532*** 3.942*** 3.771*** 3.520*** 2.693*** 1.967** 1.814** 1.512**
(0.713) (0.797) (0.908) (1.041) (1.074) (1.012) (0.942) (0.878) (0.764) (0.606)
R-squared 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96
Notes: 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions are based on a sample of 770 observations and include time dummies and country fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.





Table 5: Female Labor Force Participation, Fixed Effects, 2SLS Estimation 
Second Stage
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Total Fertility Rate
(i) 0.616 -7.898** -16.111*** -17.056*** -15.392*** -13.424*** -9.460** -7.343* -4.688 -1.858
(3.251) (3.161) (4.439) (5.359) (5.427) (5.033) (4.372) (3.809) (3.285) (2.141)
Female life expectancy 0.341** 0.105 -0.370 -0.413 -0.242 -0.285 -0.132 -0.183 0.045 0.109
(0.146) (0.170) (0.239) (0.275) (0.287) (0.253) (0.223) (0.177) (0.155) (0.093)
Capital to Working age population -0.196*** 0.255*** 0.713*** 0.706*** 0.661*** 0.621*** 0.562*** 0.469*** 0.325*** 0.062
(0.073) (0.071) (0.094) (0.114) (0.116) (0.110) (0.096) (0.087) (0.074) (0.054)
Urban population (% of total)  -0.160* -0.168* -0.597*** -0.662*** -0.639*** -0.530*** -0.429*** -0.261** -0.127 0.035
(0.090) (0.096) (0.131) (0.159) (0.162) (0.151) (0.133) (0.115) (0.097) (0.065)
Average schooling years, male >15yrs 0.195 -0.388 1.104 1.190 1.153 0.602 0.482 0.540 0.224 -0.531
(0.850) (1.007) (1.440) (1.587) (1.577) (1.419) (1.225) (1.059) (0.881) (0.595)
Average schooling years, female >15yrs 0.310 -0.249 -3.966 -4.508 -4.192 -3.469 -2.640 -2.379 -1.381 0.505
(1.880) (1.956) (2.754) (3.162) (3.156) (2.893) (2.484) (2.187) (1.851) (1.238)




Female life expectancy -0.040***
(0.009)
Capital to Working age population 0.022***
(0.002)
Urban population (% of total)  -0.019***
(0.006)
Average schooling years, male >15yrs 0.231***
(0.059)





* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions are based on a sample of 770 observations and include time dummies and country fixed effects. 
(i) TFR is instrumented for using the Abortion Index. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent Variable: Female Labor Force Participation, by Age Group
Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate 
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Table 6: Female Labor Force Participation, Fixed Effects, 2SLS Estimation, with country-specific time trend 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Total Fertility Rate
(i) 1.373 -6.391* -6.291* -9.815** -12.454*** -10.530** -7.143* -6.288* -4.753 -4.120
(3.732) (3.366) (3.269) (3.866) (4.396) (4.138) (3.738) (3.445) (3.138) (2.651)
Female life expectancy 0.015 0.044 0.040 0.182 0.431*** 0.205 0.289** 0.189 0.328*** 0.186*
(0.137) (0.124) (0.120) (0.142) (0.162) (0.152) (0.138) (0.127) (0.115) (0.098)
Capital to Working age population -0.261* 0.038 0.294** 0.368** 0.423** 0.402** 0.369** 0.369*** 0.257** 0.206**
(0.147) (0.133) (0.129) (0.153) (0.173) (0.163) (0.147) (0.136) (0.124) (0.105)
Urban population (% of total)  -0.123 -0.147 -0.387*** -0.387** -0.498*** -0.445** -0.254 -0.189 -0.122 -0.148
(0.162) (0.146) (0.142) (0.168) (0.191) (0.179) (0.162) (0.149) (0.136) (0.115)
Average schooling years, male >15yrs -0.683 0.924 0.491 1.596 2.319* 2.259* 2.015* 2.272** 1.508 1.235
(1.151) (1.038) (1.008) (1.193) (1.356) (1.277) (1.153) (1.063) (0.968) (0.818)
Average schooling years, female >15yrs 0.214 -2.046 -1.531 -3.497** -4.539** -4.481** -3.771** -4.308*** -3.144** -1.992*
(1.675) (1.511) (1.467) (1.735) (1.973) (1.858) (1.678) (1.546) (1.409) (1.190)
Cragg-Donald F-stat 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26 8.26
R-squared 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
Notes: 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(i) TFR is instrumented for using the Abortion Index. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions are based on a sample of 770 observations and include time dummies, country fixed effects and country specific time trends. 





Table 7: Female Labor Force Participation Fixed Effects, 2SLS Estimation with a Country Specific Trend and Lagged Female 
Labor Force Participation Rate 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Total Fertility Rate
(i) 1.373 -7.779* -3.227 -7.686* -8.957** -5.008 -3.348 -3.185 -2.416 -1.826
(3.732) (4.133) (4.228) (3.975) (4.057) (3.533) (3.167) (3.094) (3.154) (2.759)
Lagged Participation 0.262*** 0.460*** 0.497*** 0.527*** 0.581*** 0.627*** 0.529*** 0.396***0.325***
(0.077) (0.113) (0.083) (0.065) (0.058) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.050)
Female life expectancy 0.015 0.029 -0.014 0.165 0.355*** 0.016 0.230** 0.089 0.267*** 0.097
(0.137) (0.129) (0.111) (0.110) (0.118) (0.108) (0.095) (0.097) (0.099) (0.087)
Capital to Working age population -0.261* 0.104 0.182 0.201 0.210 0.154 0.138 0.178 0.097 0.077
(0.147) (0.135) (0.133) (0.141) (0.144) (0.123) (0.115) (0.114) (0.117) (0.103)
Urban population (% of total)  -0.123 -0.216 -0.316 -0.242 -0.411** -0.236 -0.099 -0.134 -0.140 -0.184
(0.162) (0.195) (0.196) (0.202) (0.193) (0.168) (0.151) (0.145) (0.146) (0.125)
Average schooling years, male >15yrs -0.683 1.223 -0.183 0.728 0.702 -0.004 0.050 0.454 0.212 0.376
(1.151) (1.062) (1.023) (1.043) (1.103) (0.971) (0.884) (0.870) (0.894) (0.772)
Average schooling years, female >15yrs 0.214 -2.049 -0.007 -1.612 -1.455 -0.526 -0.491 -1.330 -1.019 -0.576
(1.675) (1.525) (1.495) (1.483) (1.564) (1.373) (1.237) (1.216) (1.248) (1.088)
Cragg-Donald F-stat 8.26 5.96 4.53 5.71 5.76 5.53 6.40 6.62 6.75 6.12
R-squared 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Number of Observations 770 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673
Notes: 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions are based on a sample of 770 observations and include time dummies, country fixed effects and country specific time trends. 
(i) TFR is instrumented for using the Abortion Index. Robust standard errors in parentheses.







Table 8: Female Labor Force Participation 2SLS Estimation: First-Stage Results (country-specific time trend and lag) 
First Stage
Age Group 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Abortion Index -0.045*** -0.036** -0.031** -0.035** -0.036** -0.035** -0.038** -0.039** -0.039*** -0.037**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Lagged Participation -0.016*** -0.025*** -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010** -0.008* -0.008* -0.012**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Female life expectancy 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Capital to Working age population 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Urban population (% of total)  -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Average schooling years, male >15yrs 0.262*** 0.222*** 0.216*** 0.230*** 0.239*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.245*** 0.245***
(0.053) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
Average schooling years, female >15yrs -0.415*** -0.339*** -0.331*** -0.345*** -0.357*** -0.361*** -0.358*** -0.359*** -0.361*** -0.362***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Observations 770 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Notes: 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions are based on a sample of 770 observations and include time dummies, country fixed effects and country specific time trends. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 5: Simulation of the Economic Consequences of Fertility Reduction in South Korea  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable Description 
Age-Group-Specific 
Female Labor Force 
Participation 
The labor force participation rate is the number of women in the 
labor force in a given age group divided by the female 
population of the same age group. Labor force participation data 
are from the International Labor Organization (ILO 1997; ILO 
Bureau of Statistics 2007). The data from 1960–1980 and from 
1980–2000 are taken from two different data sets. To ensure 
continuity in the data we take the growth of participation from 
1960–1980 in one data set and extrapolate back from the 1980 
participation rate in the 1980–2000 dataset.  
Lagged Female Labor 
Force Participation 
The participation rate of the cohort of interest in period t-5. For 
example, the lagged participation of 25–29 year old females in 
2000, is the participation of the 20–24 year olds in 1995. For 
data source see Age Group Specific Female Labor Participation 
(ILO 1997; ILO Bureau of Statistics 2007).  
Fertility (TFR)  The total fertility rate is the average number of children that 
would be born to a woman over her fertile life if she were to 
experience the current age-specific fertility rate through these 
years. The data are taken from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2006). For the missing survey years 
1965 and 1975, we take the linear averages of 1962 and 1967, 
and 1972 and 1977 survey values, respectively.  
Female Life Expectancy  Defined as female life expectancy at birth. Data are from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006) and linearly 
interpolated between survey years. 
Capital per working-age 
population 
Total capital stock in 2004 US$ PPP from the Penn World 
Tables 6.2 (Heston et. al., 2006) divided by the population in the 
age groups 15 to 64. Population data come from the World 
Population Prospects (United Nations 2004).  
 
Urban Population  Percent of the total population living in an urban area. Source:  
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006). 
Average years of schooling 
in the female/male 
population  >15 
The average years of schooling among females and males above 
the age of fifteen. Source: Barro and Lee (2000). 
Abortion Index  Abortion Index is the sum of the 7 abortion law indicator 
variables. In each abortion law category – life threatening, 
physical health of the mother, mental health of the mother, rape, 
fetal impairment, economic, request – a one indicates that an 
abortion is legally available for the classified reason and a zero 
that it is not. The Abortion Index ranges from zero, which 
indicates that abortion is not legal under any classification, and 
seven, which means that an abortion is available for all of the 




Table A2: Country List 
1 Afghanistan      34 Guinea-Bissau      67 Panama     
2 Algeria      35 Haiti      68 Papua New Guinea   
3 Argentina      36 Honduras      69 Peru     
4 Australia      37 Hungary      70 Philippines     
5 Austria      38 Iceland      71 Poland     
6 Bahrain      39 India      72 Portugal     
7 Bangladesh      40 Indonesia      73 Rwanda     
8 Barbados      41 Iran, Islamic Rep.    74 Senegal     
9 Belgium      42 Iraq      75 Sierra Leone    
10 Benin      43 Ireland      76 Singapore     
11 Botswana      44 Israel      77 South Africa    
12 Brazil      45 Italy      78 Spain     
13 Cameroon      46 Jamaica      79 Sri Lanka    
14 Canada      47 Japan      80 Sudan     
15 Central African Republic    48 Jordan      81 Swaziland     
16 Chile      49 Kenya      82 Sweden     
17 China      50 Korea, Rep.     83 Switzerland     
18 Colombia      51 Kuwait      84 Syrian Arab Republic   
19 Congo, Rep.     52 Lesotho      85 Tanzania     
20 Costa Rica     53 Liberia      86 Thailand     
21 Cyprus      54 Malawi      87 Togo     
22 Denmark      55 Malaysia      88 Trinidad and Tobago   
23 Dominican Republic     56 Mali      89 Tunisia     
24 Ecuador      57 Mauritius      90 Turkey     
25 Egypt, Arab Rep.    58 Mexico      91 Uganda     
26 El Salvador     59 Mozambique      92 United Kingdom    
27 Fiji      60 Nepal      93 United States    
28 Finland      61 Netherlands      94 Uruguay     
29 France      62 New Zealand     95 Venezuela, RB    
30 Gambia, The     63 Nicaragua      96 Zambia     
31 Ghana      64 Niger      97 Zimbabwe     
32 Greece      65 Norway     
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Hence the Hessian matrix of 2
nd derivatives is negative semi-definite and the first-order 
conditions give a local maximum. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 